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and what should be the instructions to the local
authorities on this point.
3. Te dealt with the smaller Concessions
generally in our recent Report on the Situation in China (0.0.S.-59, dated January 11th). We there pointed out (para.7) "that the protection of the
"smaller Concessions must, as indicated in our first Report (C.I.D. Paper No.617-P) devolve upon the "Naval Forces. The Navy, however, cannot, as a "general rule, do more than afford protection against
•
" mot violence. If it is a question of dealing with
organised military forces evacuation will usually "be the only course"
4. These principles apply generally to the case of Shameen, but there are certain points which
differentiate it from most of the other Concessions. Firstly, it is situated on an island in the river, separated by a narrow creek from the mainland; but, as the creek is usually crowded with small craft, its importance
as a military
obstacle is less than appears at first sight, unless these vessels are cleared away before events are
precipitated.
Secondly, Shameen is so near to
Hong-Kong that troops can easily be sent up, and this course has been followed in the past.
Other
special considerations are set forth in the following Conclusions of the Memorandum by the General Staff attached to C.I.D. Faper No.722-E, which we quoted
in pars. 10 of our last Report:-
"(a) Any action taken with regard to Shameen,
which involves rilitary consequences, will have to be taken in co-operation with, and with the prior agreement of, the Promh, who have a definite share in the foreign concession.
(b) The evacuation of Shameen will almost certainly involve its looting and
possibly its destruction by the Cantoneз0.
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